Pacta sunt servanda.
Practice area · I
Removal of INTERPOL red notices, extradition and transnational defence
A red notice is not a judicial decision: it is an instrument of coercion that takes effect before any judge is involved. Entered without your knowledge, surfacing at a border post, relaying an arrest warrant or paving the way for extradition, it triggers an arrest, a visa refusal, a frozen bank account or a lasting restriction on mobility, even though no court has yet ruled on the merits. The defence we build does not challenge an isolated act: it dismantles the entire apparatus, from the INTERPOL alert to surrender, including its banking and informational ramifications. An INTERPOL red notice is disarmed early, through a comprehensive, tailored strategy.
Red notice or diffusion entered without your knowledge; request for access, correction or deletion before the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF); arrest or imminent risk of arrest; international or European arrest warrant, extradition request; lawfare, neutralisation of a political opponent or economic warfare; transnational repression; banking consequences, visa refusals, private compliance databases and informational after-effects persisting beyond deletion: characterising the measure and sequencing the actions always precede the response.
Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files
Request for access, correction or deletion before INTERPOL's CCF
Extradition and surrender
International arrest warrants, European arrest warrant, judicial cooperation
Human rights
Non-refoulement, fair trial, European, Inter-American, African and UN systems
A red notice does not wait for trial to take effect: coercion precedes the judge. That coercion is what must be disarmed.
Identify your situation
Red notice, extradition, lawfare: identify your situation
Six points of entry, from the targeted individual to the correspondent firm. The firm handles each in isolation, or several together under a single strategy.
You are the subject of a red notice or a diffusion
You are the subject of an alert in INTERPOL's files, have been arrested at a border, or have just discovered that such an alert exists. Objective: to characterise the type of data and its effects, and to pursue the appropriate avenue before the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files, whether access, correction or deletion, pre-emptively where necessary.
You need to apply to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF)
A non-compliant notice or diffusion must be challenged. Objective: to demonstrate precisely the non-compliance with INTERPOL's Constitution and the Rules on the Processing of Data, Articles 2 and 3, and to ground a structured request for correction or deletion.
An arrest or a risk of arrest is imminent
Border check, active alert, risk of surrender at short notice. Objective: to activate the Crisis Room, examine without delay an urgent request for the suspension or restriction of processing, and organise an immediate defence on every front.
An arrest warrant or extradition is at stake
International or European arrest warrant, extradition request under way or foreseeable. Objective: to challenge the INTERPOL alert that carries it across borders and to argue non-refoulement, fair trial and the political nature of the prosecution before the investigating chamber.
Lawfare, political opposition or economic warfare is at play
Neutralisation of an opponent, shareholder dispute, takeover, investment dispute, elimination of a competitor, under the guise of ordinary criminal offences. Objective: to connect the criminal proceedings to their real environment and to demonstrate a purpose alien to ordinary police cooperation.
Banking consequences or informational after-effects persist
Banking exclusion, visa refusal, restriction on mobility, entries persisting in private compliance databases or archives despite deletion. Objective: to address not only the INTERPOL data but its banking and informational ramifications, until the derived databases have been purged.
The firm
A defence conceived as an architecture, not as a succession of steps.
In transnational cases, urgency does not displace method. It demands that mechanisms be characterised, fronts prioritised and decisions coordinated before coercion spreads.
Strategic diagnosis
Warning signs and aggravating factors
Certain indicators show that the situation no longer calls for ordinary handling, but for a crisis architecture. These signals are not sufficient to characterise the case in law; they warrant a rapid, confidential and structured mapping.
01
Warning signs
- Unusual border check, provisional arrest or denied boarding.
- Visa refusal, suspension of a travel document or unexplained restriction on mobility.
- A bank or compliance intermediary alluding to an alert without producing it.
- Foreign criminal proceedings that are old, opaque or suddenly reactivated.
- A national arrest warrant relayed internationally.
- No public notice, yet concrete effects begin to appear.
02
Aggravating factors
- Risk of extradition to a State where fair trial or conditions of detention are open to question.
- Dissemination of the alert in private compliance databases.
- Proliferation of parallel proceedings in several States.
- A belated reaction after arrest rather than action before travel.
- Confusion between red notice, diffusion, arrest warrant and extradition request.
03
Mistakes to avoid
- Travelling without having established whether INTERPOL data exists or may exist.
- Assuming that the absence of a public notice rules out any alert.
- Handling the CCF separately from the extradition defence.
- Neglecting the banking and informational consequences after deletion.
- Filing a generic request without evidence of the real context.
Architecture of coercion
Understanding how an alert becomes transnational coercion
National proceedings change scale once relayed through the INTERPOL network and then extended by measures affecting mobility, compliance or surrender. The defence consists in identifying each level and intervening in the right order.
01
Origin
Origin
Requesting State
Criminal proceedings, national authority, request for cooperation.
02
Basis
Basis
National warrant
National judicial decision liable to be relayed beyond national borders.
03
Network
Network
INTERPOL
Red notice, diffusion or other data processed in the system.
04
Effects
Effects
Border · visa
Border check, denied boarding, restriction on mobility or provisional arrest.
05
Extensions
Extensions
Banks · compliance
Account blocks, banking exclusion, private databases and informational after-effects.
06
Surrender
Surrender
Extradition
State and judicial surrender procedure, distinct from the INTERPOL alert.
Situation 1 · Red notice and diffusion
The red notice and the diffusion, how coercion arises
An alert entered without your knowledge, without an adversarial hearing or access to the underlying documents: in law an alert, in practice worldwide coercion.
The red notice
An entry requested by a member State, through its National Central Bureau, in INTERPOL's wanted persons file, with a view to locating and provisionally arresting a person for extradition. It is processed without any prior adversarial hearing of the person concerned and without access to the documents on which it is based. In law, it is merely an alert, not an arrest warrant. In practice, it can produce effects comparable to those of an international arrest warrant throughout the INTERPOL network, depending on the domestic law of each State.
The diffusion
A diffusion is issued by a National Central Bureau and circulates within the INTERPOL network under a regime distinct from that of the red notice. It can produce comparable effects, in particular as regards arrest, border checks or restrictions on mobility. Its compliance remains subject to INTERPOL's Constitution and the Rules on the Processing of Data, and may be contested before the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files where data is being processed. Other alerts, including the blue notice, serve to collect information on a person without authorising arrest, but reveal a State's interest in that person.
The effects, immediate and lasting
The effects are concrete: risk of arrest when crossing a border, visa refusal, suspension of travel documents, lasting restriction on mobility, closure or blocking of accounts by banking compliance systems, damage to reputation. They frequently persist beyond formal deletion, for as long as the derived databases have not been purged. INTERPOL does not itself surrender or extradite: its role is to locate, to issue notices and diffusions and to coordinate police action; surrender is a matter for State and judicial authorities.
A red notice manufactures uncertainty. Deletion restores freedom of movement; removing the indirect effects restores one's position.
Situation 2 · Grounds for deletion
The grounds for a deletion request before the CCF
Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, Rules on the Processing of Data: demonstrating, point by point, that the processing does not comply with INTERPOL's rules.
Article 3 of INTERPOL's Constitution, neutrality
Article 3 of the Constitution prohibits the Organisation from undertaking any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character. It is one of the principal grounds for deletion requests where ostensible criminal proceedings conceal political persecution, economic warfare, a conflict between States or the weaponisation of the judicial process. Demonstrating the real purpose of the measure, behind its formal characterisation, is the central issue here.
Article 2 of the Constitution and human rights
Article 2 of the Constitution requires INTERPOL to act in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It may be relied upon where the notice or diffusion arises in a context of denial of justice, unfair trial, torture, arbitrary detention, risk of refoulement or disproportionate interference with the rights of the person concerned. INTERPOL's Constitution dates from 1956; the Rules on the Processing of Data, adopted in 2011, have been in force since 2012 and have been revised since.
The Rules on the Processing of Data
The notice or diffusion must comply with the rules applicable to the processing of data: accuracy, legitimate police purpose, proportionality, currency of the information, sufficient legal basis and consistency with international police cooperation. Data that is inaccurate, outdated, insufficiently founded or disproportionate may justify a request for correction or deletion. The request is built piece by piece: judicial decisions, political or economic elements, evidence of persecution, asylum decisions, international reports.
The deletion of a notice is not secured by generalities: it requires demonstrating, point by point, why the processing of the data does not comply with INTERPOL's rules.
Situation 3 · Arrest warrant and extradition
The arrest warrant and extradition
Investigating chamber, European arrest warrant, non-refoulement and fair trial: a decisive part of the case is decided at the surrender stage.
The arrest warrant, beyond borders
An international arrest warrant is a decision of a national judicial authority ordering the arrest of a person, intended to produce effects beyond the borders of the issuing State. It is distinct from the red notice, which is merely an alert: the warrant is issued by a judge, the notice ensures its circulation. It is this combination, a national warrant and an INTERPOL alert, that turns a domestic decision into worldwide coercion.
The European arrest warrant
Within the European Union, the European arrest warrant is its most integrated form, based on Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA: a surrender founded on mutual recognition, within tight time limits and subject to the applicable grounds for refusal. It is contested before the investigating chamber. Mutual trust ceases to operate where systemic violations of human rights are established: independence of the judicial authority, conditions of detention, genuine access to a fair trial.
Extradition, non-refoulement and fair trial
Extradition is the mechanism by which one State surrenders a person to another, for the purposes of prosecution or the execution of a sentence. The principle of non-refoulement prohibits any surrender where there is a real risk of torture, of inhuman or degrading treatment, or of a serious and irreparable violation of human rights. It may be invoked before domestic courts, before regional courts, the European Court, the Inter-American Court and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, and before the United Nations mechanisms. The defence is not confined to formal regularity: it rests on a comprehensive analysis of the risks.
The notice circulates, the warrant orders, extradition surrenders: three distinct regimes, a single case, to be handled in the right order and under a single strategy.
Architecture of defence
Coercion spreads. Strategy must precede it.
The case is not a succession of isolated acts: alert, warrant, border, surrender and derived effects must be read as a single architecture.
The notice
The alert
The warrant
The decision
Extradition
The surrender
Three distinct regimes. A single case. The strategy consists in handling them in the right order, without confusing the alert, the judicial decision and the surrender procedure.
Situation 4 · Lawfare and economic warfare
Lawfare, political opposition and economic warfare
Neutralisation of an opponent, a business dispute recast as a crime, parallel prosecutions designed to overwhelm: connecting the criminal proceedings to their real environment.
The misuse of prosecutions for political ends
Designed for legitimate cooperation, INTERPOL's mechanisms are repeatedly misused along identifiable patterns: neutralisation of political opponents, transnational persecution of a person in exile, extraterritorial extension of prosecutions lacking a sufficient factual basis. The line between prosecution and persecution then becomes porous, and the formal criminal characterisation masks a purpose unrelated to ordinary police cooperation.
Economic warfare and business disputes
A notice or diffusion may be used as leverage in a shareholder dispute, a takeover, an expropriation, an investment dispute, the break-up of a partnership, a dispute with a public or para-statal entity, or a strategy to eliminate a competitor. In principle, INTERPOL must not be used to resolve private commercial disputes; yet business disputes are artificially criminalised and presented as fraud, breach of trust, money laundering or misappropriation. The analysis must connect the proceedings to the real economic environment of the case.
Parallel prosecutions, an instrument of saturation
The deliberate multiplication of proceedings in several States serves to overwhelm the defence, exhaust its resources and lend the prosecutions a veneer of mutual legitimacy. Compounding this is the near-automatic execution of alerts by certain national authorities, without any independent assessment of their regularity or their compatibility with human rights. The response is not confined to the formal challenge of a single act: it dismantles the mechanism of coercion as a whole.
When proceedings become an instrument of pressure, the defence does not challenge an isolated act: it places the measure back in its real context and demonstrates that its purpose is unrelated to police cooperation.
Situation 5 · Banking and informational effects
The invisible effects: banks, visas, mobility, derivative databases
Banking exclusion, visa refusal, restriction on mobility, private compliance databases and informational after-effects: the coercion that outlives deletion.
Banking effects and private compliance
INTERPOL data does not remain confined to the police network. Taken up by banking compliance systems and by private compliance databases, it translates into account closures, refusals to open banking relationships, blocked payments and a banking exclusion that can hit an individual, a family, a business and its partners. These effects stem from private actors applying their own risk management rules, and often outlive the alert that triggered them.
The effects on visas and mobility
The alert contaminates mobility: visa refusals, suspended travel documents, heightened checks, refusal of entry at the border, and the inability to travel for professional, family or medical reasons. The restriction becomes lasting, without any judicial decision on the merits, and in turn feeds the databases of several administrations, each drawing on the others.
The informational after-effects and the purge of derivative databases
Even once deleted at source, a notice leaves traces: derivative police databases, watch lists, search engines, digital archives, and entries reproduced by information intermediaries. These vectors prolong the effects irrespective of the updated legal reality of the case. The strategy therefore does not end with the removal of the INTERPOL data: it addresses its ramifications, through representations to authorities, banks, private databases and intermediaries, until the derivative databases have actually been purged.
Deleting the notice is not enough: for as long as the derived banking and informational databases have not been purged, the coercion continues to produce its effects in the shadow of the deletion.
Crisis Room · priority activation
A method of intervention for critical situations
Arrest, risk of surrender, border checks, banking blockages or a proliferation of proceedings: urgency demands a response architecture before the fronts fragment.
01
Characterise
Identify the precise nature of the data, warrant or measure, together with its basis and its immediate effects.
02
Map
Pinpoint the States, jurisdictions, authorities, banks, counsel and travel affected by the crisis.
03
Prioritise
Set the order of priorities: liberty, surrender, mobility, data, assets, communication and remedies.
04
Coordinate
Bring the CCF, the competent courts, local counsel and international mechanisms together under a single strategy.
05
Stabilise
Contain the spread of the effects, address the after-effects and restore lasting control over the various fronts.
Patterns of abuse
Recurring configurations of coercion
Not isolated malfunctions, but systemic patterns, capable of producing disproportionate effects before any effective judicial review.
01
Weaponisation of prosecutions
A notice, diffusion or extradition request whose real purpose is political, economic or personal, under cover of formally characterised ordinary criminal offences. The task is to demonstrate a purpose foreign to ordinary police cooperation.
02
Economic warfare and business disputes
A shareholder dispute, takeover, expropriation, investment dispute or elimination of a competitor, recast as fraud, breach of trust, money laundering or misappropriation. The analysis connects the criminal proceedings to their real economic environment.
03
Cascade effect of national alerts
Near-automatic execution of alerts by certain authorities, without any independent assessment of their validity or their compatibility with human rights. The alert turns into an arrest before any effective judicial review.
04
Provisional arrest as leverage
Provisional arrest triggered to create immediate coercion, even though the extradition request is fragile, incomplete or subsequently abandoned. Detention becomes a means of pressure and forced negotiation.
05
Persistence of effects after removal
Continued mobility restrictions, banking blockages or reputational harm despite the deletion of a notice or the refusal of extradition, through the effect of derivative databases and information intermediaries.
06
Saturation through parallel proceedings
Deliberate multiplication of proceedings in several States to saturate the defence, exhaust its resources and create an effect of cross-legitimation between prosecutions. Without a single strategy, the defence fragments and is worn down.
What the firm puts into practice
The method
A unified sequence, from the characterisation of the data to extradition defence and stabilisation, conducted case by case under a single strategy.
01
Characterisation and access to data
Identify the type of data, whether red notice, diffusion, blue notice or derivative effects, and, where the person does not know whether they are targeted, submit a request for access to the data processed in INTERPOL's Information System, subject to the applicable rules.
02
Building the evidential file
Assemble judicial decisions, procedural documents, political or economic material, evidence of persecution, banking records, asylum or protection decisions, and international reports. The evidence is built before the request, point by point.
03
Request for correction or deletion
A structured request before the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files where data are being processed, based on Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, the Rules on the Processing of Data, disproportion, inaccuracy or obsolescence; preventive preparation of the file and appropriate steps where a notice or diffusion is liable to be issued.
04
Urgent request
Where the risk so warrants, a request for suspension, restriction of processing or a protective measure, in the event of an imminent threat of arrest, extradition, blocked mobility or irreparable harm, examined as a priority by the Crisis Room.
05
Extradition defence and international coordination
Representation before the investigating chamber, on double criminality, speciality, political character, non-refoulement and fair trial, and, where the conditions are met, measures before the regional courts and the United Nations mechanisms, including the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
06
Stabilisation and information environment
Implementation of the decision, prevention of further diffusions, purging of derivative databases, control of the information environment, de-indexing, private compliance databases, and coordination with banks, authorities and local counsel.
Expert work and strategy
Expert reports, opinions and overall strategy
Beyond the defence engagement, an offering as expert architect of the Commission's practice, of extradition and of international human rights law.
An offering distinct from the defence engagement
The firm may act without necessarily being lead counsel, in support of a firm already instructed, a legal department, a company or an institution, where the case calls for expertise in the decision-making practice of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files, in extradition or in human rights that some teams do not possess in-house.
Deliverables
Requests before the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files, memoranda on Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution and the Rules on the Processing of Data, extradition and non-refoulement risk analyses, notes on the European arrest warrant and judicial cooperation, and expert opinions for judicial or arbitral proceedings.
Recipients
This work may be intended for a targeted individual, an executive, a company, a legal department, a domestic or foreign correspondent firm, a crisis management agency, an institution or a court.
The firm's value does not lie in promising an outcome: it lies in mastering the Commission's decision-making practice and in coordinating, case after case, the alert, the surrender and their ramifications.
Effects obtained or sought
Anonymised results and effects sought
The firm does not publish named case studies. The confidentiality of engagements is a non-negotiable condition. The results below are presented by category of effects obtained or sought in INTERPOL, extradition and transnational defence cases.
Deletion of red notices and diffusions
Deletion of INTERPOL data on the basis of the applicable rules: the political character of the case, incompatibility with human rights, insufficiency of the legal basis, disproportion, obsolescence or the weaponisation of economic prosecutions.
Urgent blocking, suspension or restriction
Urgent requests seeking to avert arrest, restrict the processing of data or preserve the situation pending the Commission's examination of the case.
Requests prepared ahead of the alert
Preparation of the file and appropriate steps where a notice or diffusion is liable to be issued, in order to document the risk of abuse and prepare an immediate response.
Defence against extradition and surrender
Coordination between the Commission, national courts, regional mechanisms and the United Nations to prevent a surrender contrary to non-refoulement, to fair trial or to the prohibition of inhuman treatment.
Challenge to a European arrest warrant
Defence before the investigating chamber on the grounds for refusal, systemic human rights violations and conditions of detention, coordinated with the INTERPOL alert through which it circulates.
Banking and informational effects addressed
Addressing the after-effects: private compliance databases, debanking, mobility restrictions, obsolete entries and digital reputation, until the derivative databases have been purged.
Expert reports and expert opinions
Confidential studies and opinions on the Commission's practice, extradition, the European arrest warrant and non-refoulement, produced for proceedings or for a decision-making body.
Cases resolved without public exposure
Negotiation, institutional correspondence, confidential representations and preventive architecture that avert escalation into litigation or the media.
Anonymised illustrations
A selection of configurations handled
By category and without any identifying element. They illustrate the nature of the cases, not their outcome, and constitute neither a promise nor a guarantee of results.
01
Notice targeting a political opponent
Deletion of a red notice targeting a person prosecuted on financial charges in a context of political persecution, by demonstrating a purpose foreign to ordinary police cooperation.
02
Diffusion surfacing at a border crossing
Challenge to a diffusion revealed during a border check, with a request for access to the data processed and immediate pursuit of the appropriate remedy before the Commission.
03
Business dispute recast as a criminal matter
Deletion of an alert targeting an executive caught up in a shareholder dispute or a takeover recast as fraud or misappropriation, in a pattern of economic warfare.
04
Access request and confirmation of data
Confirmation and particulars of the data processed in INTERPOL's Information System obtained through an access request, where the person did not know whether they were targeted.
05
Action ahead of a blockage
Steps taken in advance that blocked the recording of a notice, ahead of the banking and mobility blockages that would have ensued.
06
Defence against a high-stakes extradition
Design of a defence strategy to resist an extradition request to a high-stakes jurisdiction, on the grounds of non-refoulement and fair trial.
07
European arrest warrant challenged
Favourable decision obtained, after an initial refusal, by way of appeal or re-examination, on the grounds of systemic violations and conditions of detention.
08
Banking and informational after-effects addressed
Addressing the effects persisting after removal: debanking, obsolete entries and digital reputation, until the private compliance databases and information intermediaries have been purged.
The legal framework relied upon
Constitution, extradition and human rights
The instruments, procedural guarantees and regional and UN mechanisms on which the firm's practice rests. Primary sources only.
01
INTERPOL Constitution and Rules
INTERPOL's Constitution (1956), Articles 2 and 3; Rules on the Processing of Data, adopted in 2011, in force since 2012 and revised since; Repository of Practice on Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution; Statute of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (2017) and rules of procedure of the Requests Chamber.
02
Extradition and human rights
European Convention on Extradition (1957) and protocols; Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant; applicable bilateral conventions; Code of Criminal Procedure, Articles 696 et seq. (extradition) and 695-11 et seq. (European arrest warrant); principle of non-refoulement and fair trial guarantees.
03
Regional and UN mechanisms
European Convention on Human Rights, Articles 3, 5, 6 and 8, and interim measures (Rule 39 of the Rules of Court); Soering v. the United Kingdom (1989), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (2005), Othman v. the United Kingdom (2012); American Convention on Human Rights and Inter-American Court; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and African Court; Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, special procedures and Human Rights Committee (Articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant).
04
Scholarship and sources
Decision-making practice of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files and scholarship on the weaponisation of INTERPOL; reports of international and non-governmental organisations documenting abuses; relevant international decisions. The references specific to each case are verified before any use in litigation.
INTERPOLCommission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF)UN · Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
When liberty is at stake, the defence becomes an architecture. A notice challenged early is handled from a position of strength; addressed late, after arrest or the proliferation of uncoordinated fronts, the same situation is negotiated from a position of weakness. Time is a decisive legal factor, and command of the Commission's decision-making practice is demonstrated through scholarship, case after case. The analysis phase determines the outcome.
Frequently asked questions
Deletion, Commission, extradition: the essentials
A red notice is an international alert, requested by a member State through its National Central Bureau, seeking to locate and provisionally arrest a person with a view to extradition. It is entered in INTERPOL's wanted persons database and circulated to member countries.
No. It does not constitute an arrest warrant and has no binding force in itself. It is a request to locate and, where appropriate, provisionally arrest a person, whose execution depends on the domestic law of each State. INTERPOL does not effect surrender: its role is confined to location, notices, diffusions and police coordination.
A diffusion is issued by a National Central Bureau and circulates within the INTERPOL network under a regime distinct from that of the red notice. It may produce comparable effects, particularly in terms of arrest, border checks or mobility blockages. It remains subject to INTERPOL's Constitution and the Rules on the Processing of Data, and its compliance may be challenged before the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files where data are being processed.
By way of a request before the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files seeking access to, correction of or deletion of the data, accompanied where appropriate by an urgent request for suspension or restriction of processing. The request demonstrates that the measure fails to comply with INTERPOL's Constitution and the Rules on the Processing of Data.
Yes, an access request may be submitted to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files, subject to the applicable rules. Some notices are not public; the absence of a notice on INTERPOL's public website does not necessarily mean that no data are being processed.
Useful documents for an initial analysis
Preparing the first contact
There is no need to send a complete file at the first contact. Certain elements make it possible to characterise the situation quickly.
- Copy of passport or identity document
- Available judicial decisions
- National arrest warrant, indictment or judgment
- Information on the notice, diffusion, arrest or border check
- Requesting country and country where the person is located
- Extradition or asylum proceedings in progress
- Visa refusal decisions, banking blockage or debanking
- Evidence of the political, economic or personal context
- Press articles, reports of non-governmental organisations, international decisions
- Names of local counsel already instructed
- Known critical deadlines
- Reputational or media exposure
The purpose of the first exchange is to assess the urgency and the relevance of an intervention. It does not, in itself, constitute a full opinion on the prospects of success.
Modes of intervention
Six ways of engaging the firm
For the targeted individual, for counsel already instructed, for judicial or arbitral proceedings, on a preventive basis, or for the referring firm that outsources expertise.
01
Direct advice and representation
Full engagement for the targeted individual: strategy, referral to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files, defence against extradition and surrender, regional and UN coordination, under a unified vision of the case.
02
Co-counsel and strategic reinforcement
Alongside counsel already instructed, in France or abroad: niche expertise and management of the international dimensions of the case, without supplanting lead counsel, who retains the conduct of the local defence.
03
Expert support for referring firms
Advice and expertise in proceedings (Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files, extradition, international mechanisms), consultations and preparation of case files as confidential support, with attribution and the client relationship remaining with the referring firm.
04
Expert witness and professional opinion
Expert opinion on the Commission's decision-making practice, extradition, non-refoulement, the European arrest warrant or international human rights law, for judicial or arbitral proceedings, with oral testimony available.
05
Targeted engagement on a strategic front
Handling of a specific front within a strategy coordinated by other counsel: request before the Commission, defence against extradition, referral to a regional or UN mechanism, banking and informational aspects, with reporting to coordinating counsel.
06
Monitoring, anticipation and prevention
Preventive arrangements for an exposed individual or executive: exposure mapping, monitoring of warning signs of an alert, preparation of the file ahead of a foreseeable notice, and a protective architecture put in place before escalation.
Engagements led by Professor Ludovic Hennebel, Avocat à la Cour (Aix-en-Provence Bar), Professor of International Law at Aix-Marseille University and elected Expert of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Contact by profile
Find the right point of entry
Depending on your profile, an initial confidential orientation discussion, without mutual commitment.
Exposed individuals
Red notice, diffusion, arrest abroad, visa refusal or banking blockage targeting an individual.
Companies and executives
Commercial dispute turned criminal prosecution, economic warfare, notice or diffusion targeting an executive.
States and sovereign entities
Compliance of requests, diplomatic dimension, officials or former office-holders targeted by an alert.
Political figures and former leaders
Politically motivated notice, exile, extradition request or weaponised arrest warrant.
Lawyers, correspondents and crisis agencies
INTERPOL or extradition aspects of a case, co-counsel, confidential expert support and expert opinion.
Families and representatives of a targeted individual
Relative arrested abroad, detention, risk of surrender, imminent extradition request.
Related practice areas
Continue within the firm's ecosystem
INTERPOL and extradition defence interlocks with lawfare, investigations, sanctions, immunities and human rights. Related Praxis resources and Corpus entries.
A red notice is not a conviction: it is a mechanism of coercion. The defence does not contest an isolated act; it dismantles the apparatus.
A notice, a diffusion, an extradition? Let us talk.
Exposed individual, executive, company, political figure, family of a targeted individual or correspondent firm: from the moment you make contact, the firm examines the situation as a priority and can arrange an initial confidential orientation discussion, in order to assess the critical deadlines and identify the relevant options. The initial discussion entails no mutual commitment. In French, English and Spanish.