| INTERPOL Constitution, Art. 2 | Action of the Organization in the spirit of the UDHR | Brings human rights into the review of data |
| INTERPOL Constitution, Art. 3 | Prohibition of interventions of a political, military, religious or racial character | Basis for the exclusion of predominantly political cases |
| INTERPOL Constitution, Art. 36 | Establishment of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files | Statutory basis of the CCF |
| RPD, Art. 83 | Conditions for red notices: gravity, penalty thresholds, minimum data | Technical ground of non-compliance, independent of the political ground |
| CCF Statute (2017), Arts. 29 and 42 | Effects of decisions; revision for new facts | Decisions binding on the Organization; filtered revision, six-month time limit |
| CCF Operating Rules, version of 26 March 2026, and Portal User Guide (March 2026) | Mandatory portal, formats, ceilings | 10 pages, 20 annexes, internal messaging, single draft |
| Resolution AGN/2017/86/RES/09 | INTERPOL policy on refugees | Protection of the refugee against data requested by the State of persecution |
| European Convention on Extradition (1957), Arts. 14 and 16 | Speciality; provisional arrest and time limits | Release possible at eighteen days, mandatory at forty days without a formal request |
| Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA | European arrest warrant | Autonomous regime of surrender between Member States |
| Merida (2003) and Palermo (2000) Conventions | Corruption; transnational organised crime | Frequent treaty bases for cooperation requests |
| Geneva Convention (1951), Art. 33; CAT (1984), Art. 3; ICCPR, Arts. 6, 7 and 14 | Non-refoulement and fair trial guarantees | Foundation of the non-refoulement ground before the CCF and national judges |
| Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963), Art. 36 | Consular notification and assistance | To be decided in advance: consular protection may come from the requesting State |
| ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom (1989) | Non-refoulement, Art. 3 ECHR | Prohibition of surrender where there is a real risk of ill-treatment |
| ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (GC, 2005) | Binding force of interim measures (Rule 39 of the Rules) | Ultimate safeguard against imminent surrender |
| ECtHR, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom (2012) | Flagrant denial of justice; diplomatic assurances | Grid for assessing the assurances of the requesting State |
| ECtHR, Trabelsi v. Belgium (2014) | Irreducible life sentences | Limit on extraditions to sentences without effective review |
| CJEU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru (C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, 2016) | Surrender and inhuman treatment | Two-stage examination: general deficiencies then individual risk |
| CJEU, Petruhhin (C-182/15, 2016) | Extradition of a Union citizen to a third State | Information of the State of nationality; review in light of the Charter |
| CJEU, LM (C-216/18 PPU, 2018) | Judicial independence of the issuing State | Extension of the Aranyosi grid to fair trial |
| CJEU, OG and PI (C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU, 2019) | Independence of the EAW issuing authority | Exclusion of public prosecutors exposed to instructions from the executive |
| ICJ, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v. Belgium, 2002) | Personal immunity of the serving Minister for Foreign Affairs | Framework for immunity grounds in sovereign cases |
| House of Lords, Pinochet (No. 3) (1999) | Functional immunity and torture | Limit on the immunity of the former head of State, scope debated |
| PACE Resolution 2161 (2017) | Abusive use of the INTERPOL system | Pan-European institutional documentation of the phenomenon |
| European Parliament, EXPO_STU(2019)603472 | Misuse of Interpol's Red Notices and impact on human rights | Documentation of the recurrence of abuse configurations |